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FORUM

(1971),"the Supreme Court shifted
the emphasis from the words themselves to the context in which they
were uttered and thereby limited the
doctrine as announced in Chaplinsky." Diehl, 294 Md. at 475, 451 A.2d
at 120.
In Cohen, the Supreme Court refused to classify the expression "Fuck
the Draft" lettered on the back of a
jacket worn in a courthouse as
"fighting words" because they were
not directed to the person of the
hearer nor intentionally provoked a
given group to hostile action. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland applied this narrowed application of
the "fighting words" doctrine in
Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d
41 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977). The court in Diehl adopted
the Downs holding stating that "even
though the views expressed might
be offensive to someone who overheard them, they were not directed to such persons and, as a result, were not under the rubric of
fighting words." Diehl, 294 Md. at
476-77, 451 A.2d at 121. However,
Diehl's words were directed toward
someone, specifically, Officer Gavin.
The court opted not to address the
question whether a different and
higher standard applies when the
addressee is a police officer.
The court found direction from
Downs, which "teaches us that the
use of the word 'fuck' is not punishable in the absence of compelling
reason." Id. at 477, 451 A.2d at 122.
No such compelling reason was
found in this case. The court held
that Diehl had a right to verbally
protest the unlawful exercise of police authority, and the utterance in
question "though distasteful, forcefully conveyed the intensity of his
objection." Id. at 478-79, 451 A.2d
at 122. Diehl's words were held to
be no more than an emotional and
emphatic response to Gavin's order. "In such moments, one man's
vulgarity may well be another's vernacular." Id. at 479, 451 A.2d at 122.

State v.

Randall Book Corp.
In State v. Randall Book Corp., Md. App. _ ,452 A.2d 187 (1982),
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland reviewed the dismissal of
charges against the Randall Book
Corporation, where the trial court
found Article 27, §416D of the Annotated Code of Maryland to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Section 416D is basically an
obscenity statute, although the
Maryland Legislature deleted the
word "obscene" (primarily due to
the confusion in the law on obscenity handed down by the United
States Supreme Court). Section 416D,
in essence, states that "advertising
the human body depicting sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct
or sexual excitement" is a crime. See
Randall Book Corp., Md. App. at
, 452 A.2d at 188.
The appellate court in Randall Book
Corp. noted the recent court of appeals' opinion in Blaine Wilson Smiley v. State, Md. -, 450 A.2d
909 (1982) and found that case to be
determinative of the constitutional
issue before them. In Smiley, the
court held that Section 416D was
enacted to broadly prohibit advertising which depicted obscenity, enabling the court to apply the standards enuciated in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973).The court in Smiley found that:
[w]hen the Miller standards are
embodied in section 416D, it
becomes patent that the statute
is not overbroad and vague. By
requiring compliance with the
Miller standards, "a person of
ordinary intelligence [is given]
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
the statute," and the statute is
not "so indefinite that 'it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions.' "
Smiley, Md. at -, 450 A.2d at
912, citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979).
The primary issue-the constitutional question-raised in Randall

Book Corp. was answered fully by
the decision in Smiley, and the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded the case against Randall
for further proceedings.

Miller v. State
In Miller v. State, Md. App.
-,
A.2d
(1982), Miller
was indicted on charges of robbery
with a deadly weapon, kidnapping,
rape and various other sex offenses.
The charges arose out of an incident
that occurred on October 28, 1980.
On June 16, 1981 Miller's trial began
and he was convicted by June 19,
1981. On appeal, the appellant raised
issues based on lack of trial by impartial jury, lack of speedy trial and
based on error in permitting a State
witness to testify despite non-disclosure of the witness' name during
the discovery process.
The appellate court addressed the
speedy trial issue first, examining in
detail the circumstances surrounding the appellant's arrest and trial
in relation to Maryland Rule 746.
Rule 746 provides in part that:
a trial date shall be set which
shall be not later than 180 days
after the appearance or waiver
of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the
court pursuant to Rule 723
(hereinafter referred to as the
"180 day rule").
Counsel for the appellant first entered his appearance on December
11, 1980 and pre-trial motions were
heard on June 9, 1981. The appellant contended that June 9, 1981
constituted the 181st day after appearance of counsel. The court corrected this miscalculation, citing
Maryland Rule 8 which in essence
requires that the day which triggers
the time period is not to be included
in the calculation.
Upon further examination of the
speedy trial issue, the court found
the case of State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md.
App. 20, 425 A.2d 1051 (1981) to be
controlling. As a result of this case,
the court held the appellant had

